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Abstract 
This article conceptualises carceral economies of migration control. First, I argue that “privatization” 
signals a reorganization of authority, rather than a relocation of ownership from public to private 
domains. Second, I argue for greater attention to the socio-technical practices of measurement and 
valuation specific to migration control through which commodification becomes possible. Third, this 
reorganization of authority has produced (1) status value, a form or value specific to immigration 
policing’s juridico-political position; and (2) valuation practices that translate, commensurate and 
circulate migrant life as a marketizable entity.  
Acknowledgments: 
Insightful comments from Kate Coddington, Deirdre Conlon, Glenda Garelli, Martina Tazzioli, 
Cheryl McEwan, Ben Anderson, Louise Amoore and Oliver Belcher on previous versions helped 
sharpen the argument. Special thanks to Nina Laurie for her generous editorial guidance and to the 
three reviewers and editor for pushing me to further hone the article’s contributions.  All errors are 
mine. 
Introduction 
This article argues that the carceral geographies of migration control have become carceral 
economies. Combining detention, forced mobilities and border closures, contemporary migration 
controls have produced new ways of valuing people on the move. In the United States, carceral 
economies have relied heavily upon the private prison contractors to develop and expand 
infrastructure for detaining adults, children and families, including the wide use of electronic 
monitoring. European Union member states have worked with private prison companies, security 
companies, and non-profit organizations in their efforts to both harmonize asylum systems and 
enforce borders. Germany has hired three global consulting firms—McKinsey & Co., Ernst and 
Young, and Roland Berger—to advise on cost-saving efficiencies in its asylum processing 
procedures, resulting in the widespread use of subsidiary humanitarian protection that prevents family 
reunification (Stanley-Becker, 2017). Some EU member states administer debit cards, drawing 
together financial services companies, international NGOs and refugees in entangled transactions 
(Tazzioli, 2019). Outsourcing migration control is not confined, of course, to the Global North (cf. 
Heller, 2019). In South Africa migrants are detained in a privately owned and operated detention 
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centre, and policed in ways that draw on longer histories of racialised foreignness (Vigneswaran, 
2019), while the International Organization for Migration manages borders, detention and repatriation 
in other under-resourced countries (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; Ashutosh and Mountz, 2010). 
Containing migrants through economic management, contemporary migration control practices have 
produced new ways of commodifying migrant life.  
The carcerality of migration control practices is critical to these economies of control. Carceral spaces 
simultaneously criminalise, contain, and mobilise migrants, inscribing national borders onto migrants’ 
bodies and embedding bordering practices in everyday life (Mountz et al., 2012). Seen as a ‘fix’ for 
surplus, risky, and racialised populations, incarceration’s expansion has relied upon the linking up of 
different circuits of value (Gill et al., 2018; Gilmore, 2007). Imprisonment has become a go-to policy 
response for social problems, as carceral punishment and labour regulation are mutually embedded 
(Cassidy et al., 2019). Noting the mobility of carceral tactics, carceral geographers have called for a 
broader conceptualisation of carcerality to include electronic monitoring, post-release reporting 
requirements, and other punitive approaches to poverty and social risk (Moran et al., 2018). These 
economic changes intersect with highly creative state territorial strategies of offshoring, outsourcing 
and externalisation to manipulate when and where people claim refugee status from persecution 
(Tazzioli, 2018; Tazzioli and Garelli, 2018; Mountz, 2011). In deciding admissibility, detainability, 
and deportability, immigration and asylum laws attempt to make migrants dependent on service 
providers and, in doing so, valuable to others in their excludability (Coddington et al., 2020).   
This diversification of spatial practices has led carceral geographers to retheorize carceral space 
through the mobilities (Turner and Peters, 2016), intimate (Conlon and Hiemstra, 2017) and macro-
economies of detention, imprisonment and encampment (Gill et al., 2018). Research on migration 
control has been especially important for rethinking carceral space, as migrants are detained on ships, 
in waiting rooms, in hotels, and in ‘hotspot’ processing centres. As Mountz et al. (2013) argue, 
detention is a process of bordering, mobility and exclusion, rather than a closed space. In fact, 
geographers have argued that redirecting people, things and practices is so essential to carceral space, 
so much so that mobility—not enclosure—constitutes the carceral (Turner and Peters, 2016; 
3 
 
Mitchelson, 2019). Similarly, critical migration research has generated a fundamental rethinking of 
how state power, space, rights, politics, identity and citizenship constitute each other, especially in 
migration control’s outsourcing and privatization of executive powers to detain and deport migrants 
(Coleman, 2012; Doty and Wheatley, 2013; Fernandes, 2007; Flynn, 2017; Golash-Boza, 2009; 
Hiemstra, 2019; Lahav, 1998; Zolberg, 2008). For this reason, Gill et al. (2018) argue that the concept 
‘carceral circuits’ better describes the meta-institutional networks that enable and sustain expanding 
carceral geographies. 
Despite the dynamism of theorizing carceral space, borders and biopolitics, there is a tendency within 
these approaches to invoke economy as context, as a backdrop or supportive infrastructure to the 
politics of migration control. Harvey’s theorisation of neoliberalism and circuits of capital has become 
particularly important (see Gill et al., 2018; Hiemstra and Conlon, 2017), but without engaging with 
vibrant debates over capitalism’s relationship to non-capitalist economies, value and 
commodification, marketisation or feminist political economy. To account for the heterogeneity of 
carceral economies, researchers need to conceptualise how different, but complementary political and 
economic practices constitute migration control practices.  
Below I show how migrant life is made valuable for extraction within the scattered and strewn 
relations that make up the apparatus of migration control, where private contractors, in particular, 
thrive with little oversight. Specific forms of value, economic calculations, and commodities make 
these relationships hang together and facilitate immigration and border policing in a fragmented, but 
effective, manner. How has migrant life, ostensibly excluded from political rights, attained value to be 
extracted by private firms or across industries? What rationalities, practices, and relations of force 
circulate within them, and what novel forms of value, labour and commodification is migrant life 
within carceral economies capable of producing?  
To conceptualise carceral economies of migration control, I turn to research on bioeconomies, 
marketisation and racial capitalism to query the specific economic forms at work in carceral 
economies of migration control. Marketizing non/human life has changed who and what is understood 
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as living – as a political subject and as a rights-bearing subject – and recent expansions of capital and 
finance into nature have produced new kinds of commodities (Collard, 2014; Cooper, 2008; Rajan, 
2006; Johnson, 2014). Critical economic geographers and sociologists argue that marketizing value is 
itself a political project to reconfigure the terms through which individuals (primarily) accumulate and 
circulate value (Berndt and Boeckler, 2012; Callon, 1998). Moreover, as making markets relies on 
sovereign and legal power (Langley, 2015), migration policies have been important to this project: 
national economic policies utilize sovereign power to make workers mobile (Martin and Prokkola, 
2017), depoliticize exclusionary practices (Darling, 2016a, b), dispossess them of land and withdraw 
support for social reproduction (Tadiar, 2013). Drawing on cultural economy approaches, this article 
offers a framework for conceptualising the socio-technical practices that draw law, labour, waiting 
time and disciplined mobility together in new ways. 
This article contributes a nuanced conceptualisation of carceral economies of migration control as 
assemblages made to circulate specific forms of value. I locate these economies in broader 
transformations of capitalism, especially new ways of commodifying and devaluing racialised lives. 
Below, I first discuss how the concept of industry has dominated and limited political economic 
analyses of migration control and then argue that these economic relationships mobilise multiple 
economic rationalities, producing fragile, chaotic and contingent circuits of value.  To understand how 
migrant life is made valuable—and how that value circulates—I argue that we need to analyse the 
socio-technical practices that compose these circuits.  Legal categorisations (refugee, asylum-seeker, 
labour migrant, illegal alien) produce a particular form of value specific to migration control regimes, 
which I call status value. I go on to discuss how migrants’ contracting and outsourcing translates 
status value into commodifiable services. In turn, these practices commensurate conflicting economic 
rationalities. Status value then circulates in multiple ways: as revenue from outsourced services, as 
data about migrants’ movements, as un- and under-paid migrant labour, as cash paid for abandoned 
migrant futures.  This approach decentres the literature’s emphasis on privatisation, as well, and asks 
what work the public-private boundary does. To close, I discuss the contributions this approach makes 
to carceral, political and economic geographies. 
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Conceptualising Carceral Economies 
Troubling Industries 
In this section, I argue that various formulations of industry have dominated—and limited— 
conceptualizations of political economies of immigration control: the immigration industrial complex 
(Fernandes, 2007; Doty and Wheatley, 2013); the migration industry (Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Sørensen, 2013; Hernandez-Leon, 2013); the illegality industry (Andersson, 2014); and the detention 
rights industry (Morris, 2017). Addressing these limitations requires rethinking privatisation as a 
reorganisation of authority to confine non-citizens. Specifically, industrial conceptualisations 
overstate the coherence of these systems, while underspecifying the economic relationships at work. 
For Doty and Wheatley (2013) the immigration industrial complex is a ‘massive, multifaceted, and 
intricate economy of power, which is composed of a widespread, diverse, self-perpetuating collection 
of organisations, laws, ideas, and actors’ (Doty and Wheatley, 2013: 438). Their analysis notably 
theorizes an industrial complex as more than economic, sustained and expanded by anti-immigrant 
discourses, elite social networks, and lobbying organizations: it is neither purely economic nor purely 
political nor social. Yet, as they go about theorising these relationships as industries, they rely upon 
economy/society, private/public boundaries and interprets the movement of carceral goods and 
services across them as problematic. Moreover, Doty and Wheatley’s conceptual project is very much 
wedded to the case of for-profit, privatized detention in the US, and remains focussed on US legal 
regimes and politics. This approach embeds US-specific distinctions between political/economic and 
public/private in their theorisation of the immigration industrial complex, limiting the reach of this 
concept. 
Research on migration journeys has also relied upon the concept of industry. Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Sørensen (2013) define the migration industry to include ‘control providers’ and non-profit ‘rescue 
industry’ organisations (expanding on Hernandez-Leon, 2013). For them, facilitation, control, and 
rescue form three overlapping prongs of the migration industry with varying degrees of ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘vertical’ market integration. They tease out how economic rationalities are imbricated with 
migration decisions at every part of the facilitation and management process; ‘economic logics’ are 
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not defined by institution. For Andersson (2014) this migration-enforcement feedback loop is both 
economically and discursively productive. As such, Andersson’s ‘illegality industry,’ ‘allows for the 
consideration of a dispersed “value chain,” or the distinct domains in which migrant illegality is 
processed, “packaged,” presented, and ultimately rendered profitable’ (Andersson, 2014: 15). The use 
of quotation marks signals a broader ambivalence towards theorising economies, value, production 
and exchange in migration control regimes. Throughout this literature, it remains unclear whether 
migration control economies are merely similar to—but not exactly—industries or if they are actually-
existing modes of production that extract, process, generate and circulate value.  
What work does ‘industry’ do conceptually? Defining migration control’s economies via industries 
and privatization takes some empirical facts for granted: the actually-existing markets for migration 
control services and dominance of for-profit firms. For some, privatization defines the political 
economy of immigrant detention. Politics is understood as economics by other means, and the 
economic is implicitly understood as a for-profit venture and profit motives as the drivers of particular 
policy decisions. For others, market relations of integration, supply and demand become explanatory 
concepts for migrant and state decision-making. These approaches incorporate implicit assumptions 
about market functions into research on carceral geographies of migration control. Yet research on 
marketization and commodification demonstrates that economizing life produces new forms of value, 
commodification and labour (Murphy, 2017).  
Conceptualising highly contested, faltering, fragile economic relationships as coherent industries 
gives them an independence that reproduces, rather than challenges, their power. Accounting for the 
role of economic rationalities in migration control requires a theoretical and methodological starting 
point that holds value, commodification, and labour as questions, rather than assumptions. How can 
we account for the multiple rationalities, discursive and material forms of productivity, and circulation 




Critical security and international relations scholars have approached similar problems in a different 
way, theorising the privatization of security (including and beyond migration and borders) as an 
assemblage of actors, practices, relationships and infrastructure rather than as an industry. Focused 
more on the transformation of sovereign power to secure the circulation of goods and people than on 
carceral spaces of migration control, this literature understands public-private relationships, ‘not so 
much a tightly drawn sovereign power but an apparatus in which diverse and sometimes contradictory 
elements come together to produce a logic of governing’ (de Goede, 2012: xxii).  Critical security 
studies scholars have highlighted how financial and state securitization processes share knowledge 
practices, expertise, and conceptions of risk (De Goede, 2012; Amoore, 2013). And because 
governments awarded counter-terrorism risk analysis contracts to some of the world’s largest 
financial and accounting firms, the connection is not metaphorical but material and monetary.  
Moreover, security professionals in North America and Europe use banal monetary transactions to 
track everyday mobilities and associations, so that economic activity itself becomes a medium of 
security knowledge (Amoore and de Goede, 2008). Finance-security assemblages have also become a 
key geoeconomic terrain (Cowen and Smith, 2009). American dominance in the private security 
sector has become an economic development concern for EU policy-makers, so much so that some 
EU-level agencies seek to establish a “European civil security market” (Hoijtink, 2014).  A series of 
EU-level research funding schemes recruited expertise from private sector security firms for 
recommendations on how to build a civil security market, thereby producing it as a field and a market 
(Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010). In so-called “weak states,” the privatisation of security is rife, from 
private security firms hired to police neighbourhoods to consulting on security policy-making to 
training police and military forced. For Abrahamsen and Williams (2010), nominally state and private 
security functions are so intertwined that state sovereignty cannot be understood through traditional 
state-centric modes, but must be understood as a security assemblage.  
Carceral economies of migration control can both learn from and contribute to this literature. Firstly, 
this article argues that these assemblages operate because they translate, commensurate and circulate 
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value between different spaces, practices and actors. The racialisation of value—and valuation 
practices’ fundamental role in economic assemblages—has been undertheorised in security 
assemblage literature. Secondly, assemblage approaches emphasize the discourses, technologies and 
practices that hold these relationships together. They do not assume an overarching logic of capital to 
explain these relationships, but instead show how different logics are brought together to enable new 
configurations of power. This is crucially important for understanding how non-monetary values like 
racialised hierarchies, xenophobia, and patriarchy enable particular economic relationships. Thirdly, 
security assemblages do not fit neatly into narratives of public sector privatization because state, 
supra-national, non-governmental, and corporate organizations work together in a wide variety of 
capacities, with different contractual obligations.  This leads to a different set of questions about state 
power: what mechanisms order and circulate power over life? How do financial practices of 
privatized security reorganise and distribute sovereign power? How are public and private put to work 
in new ways, and what work do they do? How are these relationships formed and networked to 
circulate money, practices and expertise? These questions shift the empirical, theoretical and 
methodological starting points for analysing how economic relationships govern carceral spaces of 
migration control. They emphasize that there is no necessity to the form and direction of finance-
security relationships; neither state nor capital logics produce the worlds they imagine.  
Rethinking privatisation 
From this perspective, privatisation’s explanatory role in industrial conceptualisations can be 
rethought from two directions. First, the research discussed above shows how outsourcing data 
analysis drew specific pattern recognition and risk analysis practices into state security practice, so 
that state security came to be discursively and materially constructed in financialised terms. In other 
words, these processes drew financial knowledge practices into state decision-making and blurring the 
distinction between economic and geo political risk knowledge practices.  Second, ‘the economy’ as 
such has always required state power. Legislation, for example, has always been essential to defining 
‘the economy’ as a separate sphere of human activity, and this apparent public-private/state-society 
boundary has long been understood as an effect of power (Mitchell, 1998). The distinction between 
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state and economy should be understood an internal boundary within the space of governing. As 
Mitchell argues, ‘the ability to have an internal distinction appear as though it were an external 
boundary between separate objects is the distinctive technique of the modern political order’ and is 
itself ‘a mechanism that generates resources of power’ (1998; 175, emphasis added). Privatising 
detention, asylum accommodation, and border enforcement is therefore a political technology that 
reorganises and expands governmental authority (Martin, 2017).  In doing so, privatising detention 
centres, for example, produces and extends the governance of migration, precisely by multiplying 
who can confine migrants, where and by what means. The question becomes not only ‘who profits?’ 
but how is state authority reorganised? How are these assemblages composed? 
Below, I argue that carceral economies of migration control work through particular valuation 
practices, specifically through the production of status value. In doing so, I ‘read value against the 
grain’ (Bigger and Robertson, 2017), analysing not the private or non-profit sectors definitions of 
value, but identifying the unique forms of value, commodification, and circulation produced by 
migration’s controls carceral circuitry. This approach allows me to counter-map migration control’s 
circuits of value (Gill et al., 2018), to show how the differentiation of migrant life from citizen life 
enables states to assemble outsourcing, labour extraction and disciplined mobility in highly productive 
ways, generating resources of both power and money. 
Valuing Migrant Life 
To theorise how migrant life comes to bear value for carceral service providers, non-governmental 
organisations and state agencies, I draw from research on the commodification of nature and racial 
capitalism. Research on the commodification of nature has focused on the development of new kinds 
of commodities: biological material (Cooper, 2008; Rose, 2007; Johnson, 2016), animals (Collard, 
2014), human tissue (Fannin, 2011), carbon (Collard and Dempsey, 2013), adoption, and organs 
(Radin, 1996). Similarly, clinical labour and surrogacy have challenged the boundaries of whose and 
what reproductive capacities may be paid for (Cooper and Waldby, 2014; Lewis, 2019). The 
emergence of these new markets has relied upon the valuation of processes and the commodification 
of biological reproduction. Bioeconomies, in particular, have focused on commodifying self-
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reproducing biological material (Johnson, 2016), which has required legal recognition of biological 
matter as intellectual property (Cooper, 2008; Rajan, 2006). Importantly, these new economies 
generate new forms of value, commodities and legal relationships that do not take traditional 
manufacturing as the model of capitalist production. Research on new markets for environmental 
processes and biological material has analysed how these entities become knowable as 
commodities—and that marketization is contested, fraught with problems, and usually inadequate to 
capture the ecological processes they seek to represent. To capture these tensions, this literature has 
argued for a focus on valuation practices (Bigger and Robertson, 2017), technologies of measurement 
(Robertson, 2012), and processes of commodification and commensuration (Christophers, 2016). 
Rather than asking how markets, neoliberal rationalities or industries manifest capitalist logics, they 
ask, which techniques, rationalities, and discursive practices allow these novel markets, value forms, 
and circulations to work? What kind of capitalism and what kind of nature are presumed to be 
operating?  These questions destabilise the capitalist logics and industrial relationships presumed to be 
structuring immigration and border privatisation.  
Marxist approaches understand value as an abstraction of embodied labour, an abstraction that allows 
the separation of labour value from particular workers (see Christophers, 2016). Generic labour value 
is immeasurable until commodities are traded with others. By comparing labour time through 
commodities, that labour time is translated into a commensurable quantity and the specific context of 
that labour falls out of the valuation process. Exchange value operates as a ‘concrete abstraction’ that 
translates and commensurates—and in doing so, enables circulation. These regimes of value are 
always more than economic and inherently political, however, as people negotiate, contest, and 
change the terms of exchange (Appadurai, 1998). Here I argue that, in a similar fashion, valuation 
practices render actual, living migrants as abstract migrant life. Understood as a combination of life-
sustaining processes, migrant life becomes valued in terms of services.   
Racial capitalism theorists argue that all value is racialized: surplus value from labour has historically 
relied upon grossly unequal exposure to danger and death; to the non-payment of work; the stagnation 
of housing values in predominantly black neighbourhoods in the US (Moore, 2016; Gibbons, 2018); 
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and in settler colonial contexts to genocidal clearing of land for European settlement (Ybarra, 2020). 
The racialisation of poverty, criminality and illegality are fundamental conditions for the emergence 
of carceral economies of migration control, epitomising the ways in which colonial, imperial and 
white supremacist projects “requir[e] the continued disappearance and displacement of myriad 
‘undesirable peoples’ from the landscape” (Bonds and Inwood, 2016: 722). Gilmore’s (2007) work 
explains how incarceration has become, in the US context, a solution to the overproduction of four 
kinds of surplus: land, labour, finance and state capacity. Different forms of value (real estate, wages, 
public debt, human resources) were brought together and thereby produced classed and racialized 
economies that did not explicitly present themselves as racialized.  These differentiations 
disproportionately expose rationalised groups to social and physical death (Tyner, 2019), an exposure 
exacerbated by locating detention centres in polluted areas (Ybarra, 2020). For Byrd et al., these 
‘economies of dispossession’ ‘hierarchically organiz[e] and dispos[e] social life predicated on and 
operationalized through empire and colonialism’ (2018: 3). Drawing from these literatures to 
interrogate carceral economies of migration control, I argue that the racialisation of value and the 
devaluation of surplus populations has made migrants valuable in their detainability and 
excludability. As I go on to show, carceral enclosures enable the marketisation of biological 
reproduction—the process of staying alive—by categorising, pricing and mobilising migrant life. 
Producing Status Value: Illegalisation 
Here, I examine the valuation practices that make migrants valuable in specific ways. The first 
practice is legal categorisation, which paradoxically does not appear to be an economic practice, per 
se. Yet it is foundational: legal status decisions do the work of differentiating between various forms 
of deserving, vulnerable, criminalised, and excludable migrations. Critical research has provided rich 
documentation of the means and implications of states’ various illegalised, criminalised, stigmatised 
migrant others (Coleman, 2008; Conlon, 2010; Gill, 2016; Hiemstra, 2019; Mountz, 2010; Ngai, 
2004; Varsanyi, 2008).  For others, these legal categorisations are economically productive in a more 
direct sense. De Genova (2002) argues that ‘some are deported so that others may stay’ as labourers 
under the threat of deportation; Harrison and Lloyd (2012) show how illegality affects work 
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conditions for dairy farm workers in the Midwest US. Thus, the production and valuation of migrant-
as-surplus is part and parcel of broader trends in capitalism that rely upon both non-capitalist modes 
of exchange and reserve pools of under-employed labour (Coddington et al., 2020; Denning, 2010; 
Gidwani and Reddy, 2011). Non-citizenship and illegalization are fundamental conditions for the 
emergence of carceral economies of migration control.  
By making migrants valuable in a particular way, legal status decisions produce what I call status 
value. In differentiating between mobile people, legal status decisions produce detainable and 
deportable subjects and, in turn, make migrants valuable in their excludability, detainability and 
inability to legally support themselves. Status value is, then, a value form produced by the 
illegalisation of mobile people: it refers to the specific potential their illegality offers states and 
service providers managing that illegality. As Kate Coddington’s (2018; Coddington et al., 2020) 
work in Thailand shows, refugees’ legal status enables their encampment and enclosure and, 
subsequently, their identity as a captive labour force for a nearby special economic zone. Status 
decisions embed migrants in dependent relationships with institutions that manage migrants’ 
biological life and constrain their everyday mobility (see Aradau and Tazzioli 2020 on biopolitical 
value). Particularly for excluded migrants and asylum-seekers, status decisions make migrants 
valuable to firms and NGOs working in the asylum sector, addressing the needs produced by the 
exclusion from work or other forms of care. Migrants’ status value rests in their potential in/voluntary 
labour, revenue for service contractors, transaction data and waiting time.  
Legal categorisations thereby produce particular kinds of life: people prohibited from working and 
caring for themselves through wages or further migration. Importantly for the discussion here, these 
decisions—and the spatial constraints they allow—arrange labour, reproduction and care.  Carceral 
spatial practices of migration control enforce deprivation (Conlon and Hiemstra, 2014) and invite the 
commodification of migrant life biological processes: eating, washing, staying warm, caring for 
others. These carceral economies do not commodify migrants as property but as assemblages of 
services, bed space, data and mobility. As I discuss below, carceral economies translate, 
commensurate, and circulate multiple forms of status value and diverse economic rationalities. In 
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particular, contracting, migrants’ in/voluntary work, debit cards and Assisted Voluntary Return 
programmes extract and circulate status value and thereby assemble carceral geographies of migration 
control.  
Translating Status Value: Contracting 
Where legal categorisation generates status value, contracts assemble a range of organisations to 
manage migrant life in carceral spaces. Privatisation, outsourcing and offshoring rely on legal 
agreements to authorise the delegation of the sovereign right to deny physical autonomy. As such, 
contracting is a socio-technical and political practice that embeds certain norms of economic practice 
in migration control (Darling, 2016a, b; Martin, 2017).   
Contracting, outsourcing and offshoring have been essential to the speedy expansion of carceral 
migration control practices because outsourcing allows states to bring existing expertise and 
infrastructure together and move politicised practices out of public sight.  For example, US family 
detention capacity grew from 95 beds in the Berks County Family Shelter to approximately 3500 beds 
across three facilities in a matter of months. Two practices enabled family detention’s speedy 
expansion: repurposing existing facilities and Inter-Governmental Service Agreements (IGSAs) that 
avoided lengthier competitive procurement processes for private firms.  The Artesia family detention 
centre repurposed a border patrol training facility site in a remote area of New Mexico, far from 
immigration attorneys and oversight agencies (Manning, 2015). The Karnes Civil Detention Centre in 
central Texas previously held low-risk detainees and was built to hearken the Obama Administration’s 
new ‘civil approach’ to immigration enforcement (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2012). 
To change its population from men to families, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Karnes 
County changed the wording their Inter-governmental Service Agreement (IGSA); Karnes County 
then changed the wording of its contract with GEOGroup, a private corrections firm. The South Texas 
Family Residential Centre in Dilley, Texas, emerged from a similar process of IGSA and contract 
revisions, but required building a new facility specifically for families. The location was more 
difficult to explain: Corrections Corporation of America (now CoreCivic) contracted with the city of 
Eloy, Arizona, 900 miles (1448km) away from the facility (Burnett, 2014). Because IGSAs operate 
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between government agencies, they are exempt from the normal (and lengthier) competitive bidding 
processes required for contracts between ICE and non-state organizations. Counties are supposed to 
provide oversight of these facilities and keep a portion of the ICE payments for that service. Within 
outsourced facilities health, religious, language, food, cleaning and commissary services are often 
subcontracted, as well (see Hiemstra and Conlon, 2017). Similar contracting practices are common in 
EU member states, but with highly active participation of non-profit, religious and humanitarian 
organisations (see Aradau and Tazzioli, 2019; Tyler et al., 2014; Morris, 2017).  Contracting is highly 
diverse and localised, but across contexts the practice draws together a wide range of organisations 
with different aims into temporary and contingent agreements.  
In the case of US family detention, state agencies actively and enthusiastically outsourced their work 
to other organisations in ways that cannot be explained by capitalist logics. Close analysis of 
privatisation’s mechanisms therefore reveals multiple economic rationalities: revenue-seeking 
government offices; market-avoiding private enterprises; and the delegation and outsourcing of the 
sovereign right to imprison non-citizens through a series of legal instruments, maintained through 
money transfers. While revenue may be an aim, public revenue, local employment and personal bribes 
are not the same kind of transactions as profit-seeking objectives. They circulate debt and obligations 
according to different rules and relationships. Contracts are simultaneously social, economic and 
political technologies that link different valuation practices. As such, they connect, translate and 
circulate migrants’ status value between the organisations involved. 
As socio-technical practices, contracts define both units and mechanisms of exchange, translating and 
commensurating different registers of value. For example, detention and accommodation contracts 
price space in similar ways to hotels or residence halls. It is common to break costs down into ‘bed 
days’ and ‘person days.’ Contracts therefore include things like calculations of square footage, 
staffing, services and food per migrant per day, signalling a broader efficiency rationality at work. 
Here, the goal is to keep migrants alive in custody at the lowest cost. For private sector actors, pricing 
includes a profit margin and for government agencies, contracts must still meet certain quality 
standards, especially for children. For firms, meeting quality assurance standards increases the 
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chances of additional government contracts (though poor performance is curiously under-enforced). 
While important, these valuation practices remain rather internal to firm decision-making and they 
operate in relation to highly politicized migration policy-making. Executive orders, legislative 
processes, and local activism change the broader conditions of these economies and can do so swiftly. 
In other words, privatising migration control does not fully embed immigration policy-making in 
capitalist logics; they co-exist with other norms and objectives. As such, they do not signal a 
relocation of family detention from public to private domains, but the reorganisation of authority over 
detainable, deportable people. These arrangements mobilise public-private boundaries to expand 
policing power over noncitizens.  
Commensurating Conflict: The Politics of Status Value   
In linking diverse actors with different rationalities, contracts do not work smoothly and outsourcing 
creates conflicts between different regimes of value. For example, efficient migration detention can 
also mean the maximization of deportation, rather than the minimization of cost. In the United States, 
Congress mandated a daily occupancy rate of 34,000 migrants to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement out of fear of under-utilised detention beds and wasted tax dollars. This, in turn, 
triggered calculations of daily targets for regional operations and quotas for individual officers’ 
arrests. The Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) agency oversees transfers and deportations, 
moving migrants from centre to centre to maximize the number of people detained for dollars spent 
on bed space. For state actors, management and performance targets are not oriented towards 
lowering operating costs or public expenditure, but increasing the numbers of bodies moving through 
a system. Thus, outsourcing connects actors working under multiple economic rationalities, 
calculating value according to different metrics, with different aims and objectives.  
Divergent registers of optimization frequently come into conflict, in fact. Over-crowding detention 
space has been equally problematic, prompting human rights investigations, reviews, and additional 
oversight in many cases. Migrant rights organizers frequently point out the conflict between moral, 
political and economic norms, but these critiques travel in multiple directions. In Austria, for 
example, privatization of migrant detention emerged as a response to human rights organizations’ 
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condemnation of overcrowded, outdated prison facilities (Global Detention Project, 2017). These 
examples are not fully captured by US-based conceptualisations of industrial dynamics, logics of 
neoliberal state restructuring or capital accumulation. We may identify shared practices (like 
outsourcing), but they are embedded in different regimes of value driven, in many places, by ethno-
nationalist and populist political movements. To understand how privatization, migrant rights, and 
efficiency come together requires precise analysis of the multiple and overlapping calculative 
practices at work in the business of confining, deporting and deterring migrants. 
Extracting Status Value: Unfree Labour Practices 
Under- and unpaid work has become a key technology for both ensuring compliance and for keeping 
contractors’ costs low. Bales and Mayblin (2018) argue that detention labour should be located on a 
spectrum of unfree labour, distinct from—but bearing some similarities to—coercive and exploitative 
workplaces. For Conlon and Hiemstra (2014, 2017), the violent social abstraction of bed space in US 
detention centres accompanies bureaucratization, labour extraction and engineered deprivation. 
Offered the ‘privilege’ of working in exchange for $1-3 per day, detained migrants in the US perform 
routine tasks for the detention centre to earn money to purchase inflated commissary items. Thus, the 
conditions of captivity produce additional opportunities for extracting value from migrant labour 
twice over: through migrant’s physical labour and through inflated commissary prices (Conlon and 
Hiemstra, 2014). Counties receive percentages from some of these subcontracting arrangements, 
investing public entities in this cycle of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Hiemstra and Conlon, 
2017). For Conlon and Hiemstra, these intimate economies of detention dispossess migrants and their 
families and reappropriate money to private subcontractors and countries; at the same time, money 
flows to these entities through federal contracting, thereby reappropriating federal funds to counties 
and firms.  
In Italy, meanwhile, asylum-seekers have been required to perform ‘voluntary work’ in host 
communities as a condition of receiving accommodation and subsistence support (Haller, 2017). 
Prohibited from waged work, mandatory voluntary labour becomes is both disciplinary and 
normative: community work is criteria for highly differentiated potential inclusion, an opportunity to 
17 
 
‘earn’ status, and a demonstration of ‘the deserving asylum-seeker.’  The value of asylum-seeker 
labour in Italy is not productive in an industrial sense; it circulates in multiple directions, with 
multiple objectives that overlap with, but cannot be reduced to, profit or industrial growth. Instead, 
unpaid labour points more clearly to the enduring carcerality and disciplinarity of asylum-seeker 
reception regimes beyond detention centres.    
Circulating Status Value: Disciplined Mobilities 
Status value can also circulate through disciplined mobilities (Moran, 2015) in migration control. 
While the example of family and adult migration detention draws attention to the role of enclosure in 
producing, calculating and circulating status value, movement itself has become a mode of value 
production. Firstly, in places reliant on detention like the US and UK, transfers between detention 
facilities and deportations have introduced additional logistics (Walters, 2019), contractors, and 
opportunities to engineer legal outcomes (Hiemstra, 2019; Gill, 2009). In fact, these economies rely 
on the forced and often chaotic movement of detained migrants between centres. Where human rights 
laws have limited detention, cash-based and cashless support use financial transactions to monitor 
compliance with aid recipients’ rules, as purchase data stands as a proxy for migrant mobility. Debit 
cards, in particular, are becoming widely used to disperse funds to refugees and asylum-seekers in the 
UK, Greece, Jordan and Lebanon, as well as in post-disaster recovery operations (UNHCR, 2016). 
The World Food Program and UN promote debit cards as revolutionizing humanitarian aid, both in 
allowing asylum-seekers and refugees to choose their purchases and in quickly and efficiently 
dispersing money to them (Kenyon, 2016; UNHCR, 2018).  At the same time, the cards produce the 
same kinds of transaction data used to analyse deviant patterns of movement (Aradau and Tazzioli, 
2020; De Goede and Amoore, 2008). Debit card programmes are managed by different organisations 
and agencies from country to country, however, sometimes in partnership with banks, sometimes 
operating as a distinct flow of money. To work (and many times they do not work), the debit cards 




In Greece, asylum-seekers agree to certain conditions to receive debit cards, tying assistance to 
particular kinds of behaviour and biopolitical control (Aradau and Tazzioli, 2020; Tazzioli, 2019). In 
the UK, debit cards operate in a similar way, but for rejected asylum-seekers, the cards cannot be used 
to withdraw cash. They must be used in shops that accept the cards; previously, these were confined 
to major chains and charity shops. The UK Home Office has explicitly stated that they use transaction 
data to monitor mobility and usage, deducing infractions of cardholders’ conditions from these 
patterns (Coddington, 2019). For example, if recipients use the card in too wide an area, the Home 
Office assumes they have access to money for travel or forms of support that violate their 
qualification as destitute and stop payments. If they do not use it for a period of time, the HO assumes 
they do not need it and stop payments. While non-governmental organisations in Greece do not 
currently use transaction data in this way, the UK Home Office is explicit about embracing debit cards 
for their surveillance potential (Unity Centre Glasgow, 2017). Cashless debit cards for refused 
asylum-seekers treat purchases as traces of their everyday mobilities. Simultaneously, the data only 
become meaningful when analysed by private sector experts. Using cashlessness as a 
deterrence/expulsion technique circulates transaction data between asylum-seekers, shops, services 
companies, their contractors and the Home Office: here, migrants’ everyday lives produce value as 
both needy (destitute) subjects and as data.  
Assisted Voluntary Return uses money in a similar way. For example, the International Organisation 
of Migration facilitates payments to migrants and refugees if they return to countries of origin. These 
payments recognize migrants’ goals and desires in migrating: to work, make money and return home 
with some demonstrable success (International Organisation for Migration, 2019).  But this example 
also demonstrates another way in which money becomes a mechanism of migration control. While the 
UK system uses cashless support to push self-deportation, Assisted Voluntary Return ‘pulls’ migrants 
with cash payments upon exit. Thus, destitute asylum-seekers and refugees become valuable to 
financial services companies as a population in need of particular kinds of services. NGOs connect, 
translate and value populations of asylum-seekers to those firms, drawing new actors into asylum-
seeker and refugee service provision and making asylum-seekers intelligible as service users. In 
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addition to connecting diverse actors, the circulation of money and cash are not (only) infrastructural 
enablers of migration control as above, but themselves vectors of migrant governance.  
These examples are intentionally diverse and show how carceral economies of migration control 
connect actors with different economic rationalities through specific socio-technical practices of 
valuation. My argument is not that these particular valuation practices constitute carceral economies 
of migration control everywhere in every case, nor do they constitute ‘migration economies’ 
generally. Across these practices, however, states and contractors contain and redirect human mobility 
through diverse forms of valuation, dispossession and incentivisation.  
Conclusion 
This article contributes a nuanced re-conceptualisation of migration control’s economies to the vibrant 
scholarship in carceral geography. Geographers have done important work tracing the new spatialities 
of sovereignty, state power, and bordering’s embodiments, but political geographers have not asked 
how these re-spatialisations rely upon particular deployments of public/private economic categories. 
Likewise, economic geographers have not adequately asked how punitive migration control practices 
produce new economic forms or interlace with local and regional economies. While grassroots and 
community-led movements exceed human rights claims, forging far more complex claims to social, 
economic, health, and cultural recognition (e.g. Border Network for Human Rights, 2019), researchers 
too often accept boundaries between political and economic, public and private, social policy and 
geopolitics.   
We should instead ask what work the boundaries of public/private, political/economic, 
inclusion/exclusion do. Conceptualising political economies of migration control as industries has, I 
have argued, accepted these boundaries as facts when we should treat them as questions. Shifting 
from industrial complexes to assemblages, this article offers a conceptual framework for analysing 
how migrant detainability and deportability have enabled new governmental assemblages. Contingent 
and under continual transformation, these assemblages have produced locally- and legally-specific 
regimes of value that connect up different valuation practices. For value to circulate in these 
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economies, migrant life must be valued, translated and commensurated. US detention, UK and Greek 
debit cards and Assisted Voluntary Return show how the project of staying alive in detention (eating, 
washing, staying warm) becomes commodified as service provision; migrant time becomes priced as 
‘bed space’ and ‘bed days’; migrants’ mobility becomes transaction data, valuable to analysts and to 
UK Home Office enforcement officers; migrants’ imagined futures become cash incentives. Across 
these examples, migrants under state control are figured as particular kinds of economic subjects: 
benefit-seeking, persuadable, but most certainly not potential workers or neoliberal entrepreneurial 
subjects (cf. Tazzioli, 2019). Rather, neoliberal entrepreneurial subjectivity becomes a privileged 
position for the highly skilled, self-sufficient migrant and the status value of excludable migrants 
renders migrant life available to commodification and datafication in novel ways.  
While institutionalised and enforced differently around the world, contracting remains an important 
political technology through which migrant life, detention space and mobility are made valuable. 
Contracts link state and non-state actors, subcontractors and service providers in relations of 
obligation and financial transaction, and contracts name a price for keeping migrants alive in 
confinement. At the same time, competing rationalities cannot be reduced to or explained as a profit 
logic. Rather, privatisation mobilises the public/private boundary to reorganise authority over 
migrants’ everyday lives. Privatisation itself requires a range of calculative practices—bed space, 
medical capacity, nutritional needs, hygiene, and clothing—to value migrant life.  Beyond detention 
spaces the datafication of migrant mobility within and outside of state custody points to new ways in 
which everyday mobilities become rendered as valuable sources of data for asylum agency decision-
makers. Moreover, assisted voluntary return policies calculate the value of repatriation against the 
non-liveability of illegalised status, inducing behaviour with the offer of cash. Because these practices 
do not commodify migrants’ bodies as property, but commodify their routines and biological needs as 
services, that these carceral economies can be reconciled with liberal democratic regimes and 
international human rights frameworks. 
Analysing valuation practices of migration control also emphasizes the local specificity of these 
arrangements. The examples above do not describe a global carceral economy or an abstract model, 
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but the opposite. No single over-arching logic explains these assemblages, their composition, or 
operation. They instead bring multiple rationalities, forms of expertise, regimes of value into relation 
in new ways. Incorporating analysis of localised processes of racialisation is essential to this analysis. 
Carceral economies of migration control draw upon existing processes of racialisation, marketisation, 
and anti-immigration policies. Like other disciplinary and confinement institutions, carceral 
economies of migration control are racialised and that racialisation informs how migrant life is valued 
in its excludability, confinement and disciplined mobility. Moreover, national immigration and asylum 
regimes use different categories and procedures, drawing non-state actors and migrants together in 
different configurations, held together by different governmental rationalities and socio-technical 
practices. While diverse and variable across space (Burridge and Gill, 2017), immigration, asylum and 
refugee laws render mobile humans as people in need, confinable, detainable or deportable. 
Focussing on the assembly of carceral economies of migration control opens up new questions for not 
only for research on human mobility, but also political and economic geographers interested in 
reconfigurations of sovereignty, outsourcing and offshoring, and the politics of marketisation. The 
conceptual framework above questions the apparent coherence of industrial complexes, instead 
pointing to the diverse, place-specific and ways in which migrant life is made valuable. Rather than 
ask how a detention or migration control system operates, we should ask: what kind of political 
project is at work in the marketisation of migration exclusion? How does the illegalisation of mobile 
people enable specific economic relationships? What socio-technical practices work to bridge the 
conflicting regimes of value that pervade migration and asylum politics? How do these relationships 
translate state agencies and excludable migrants into other regimes of value, as consumers, users, 
clients? What difference does marketisation make to immigration politics and vice versa?  As these 
assemblages embed migrant exclusion in broader networks of value, exchange, and circulation, what 
infrastructure, logistics and financing are necessary to sustain them? Analysing carceral economies in 
this way reveals how migration control draws from and contributes to racialised, gendered and 
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